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ABSTRACT
Black-box testing has been extensively applied to test models of
Cyber-Physical systems (CPS) since these models are not often
amenable to static and symbolic testing and verification. Black-box
testing, however, requires to execute the model under test for a
large number of candidate test inputs. This poses a challenge for
a large and practically-important category of CPS models, known
as compute-intensive CPS (CI-CPS) models, where a single simu-
lation may take hours to complete. We propose a novel approach,
namely ARIsTEO, to enable effective and efficient testing of CI-CPS
models. Our approach embeds black-box testing into an iterative
approximation-refinement loop. At the start, some sampled inputs
and outputs of the CI-CPS model under test are used to generate
a surrogate model that is faster to execute and can be subjected
to black-box testing. Any failure-revealing test identified for the
surrogate model is checked on the original model. If spurious, the
test results are used to refine the surrogate model to be tested again.
Otherwise, the test reveals a valid failure. We evaluated ARIsTEO by
comparing it with S-Taliro, an open-source and industry-strength
tool for testing CPS models. Our results, obtained based on five
publicly-available CPS models, show that, on average, ARIsTEO is
able to find 24% more requirements violations than S-Taliro and
is 31% faster than S-Taliro in finding those violations. We further
assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of ARIsTEO on a large in-
dustrial case study from the satellite domain. In contrast to S-Taliro,
ARIsTEO successfully tested two different versions of this model
and could identify three requirements violations, requiring four
hours, on average, for each violation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and de-
bugging; Formal software verification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A common practice in the development of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPS) is to specify CPS behaviors using executable and dynamic
models [5, 33, 68]. These models support engineers in a number
of activities, most notably in automated code generation and early
testing and simulation of CPS. Recent technological advancements
in the areas of robotics and autonomous systems have led to increas-
ingly more complex CPS whose models are often characterized as
compute-intensive [22, 24, 31, 55, 88]. Compute-Intensive CPS mod-
els (CI-CPS) require a lot of computational power to execute [23]
since they include complex computations such as dynamic, non-
linear and non-algebraic mathematics, and further, they have to
be executed for long durations in order to thoroughly exercise
interactions between the CPS and its environment. For example,
non-trivial simulations of an industrial model of a satellite system,
capturing the satellite behavior for 24h, takes on average around
84 minutes (~1.5 hours) [4].1 The sheer amount of time required
for just a single execution of CI-CPS models significantly impedes
testing and verification of these models since many testing and ver-
ification strategies require to execute the Model Under Test (MUT)
for hundreds or thousands of test inputs.
Approaches to verification and testing of CPS models can be
largely classified into exhaustive verification, and white-box and
black-box testing. Exhaustive verification approaches often trans-
late CPS models into the input language of model checkers or
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers. CPS models, how-
ever, may contain constructs that cannot be easily encoded into the
SMT solver input languages. For example, CPS models specified
in the Simulink language [5] allow importing arbitrary C code via
S-Function blocks or include other plugins (e.g., the Deep Learning
Toolbox [3]). In addition, CPS models typically capture continuous
1MachineM1: 12-core Intel Core i7 3.20GHz 32GB of RAM.
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dynamic and hybrid systems [15]. Translating such modeling con-
structs into low-level logic-based languages is complex, has to be
handled on a case-by case basis and may lead to loss of precision
which may or may not be acceptable depending on the application
domain. Furthermore, it is well-known that model checking such
systems is in general undecidable [14, 16, 59]. White-box testing
uses the internal structure of the model under test to specifically
choose inputs that exercise different paths through the model. Most
white-box testing techniques aim to generate a set of test cases that
satisfy some structural coverage criteria (e.g., [41, 62]). To achieve
their intended coverage goals, they may rely either on SMT-solvers
(e.g., [54, 65]) or on randomized search algorithms (e.g., [46, 72, 77]).
But irrespective of their underlying technique, coverage-guided
testing approaches are not meant to demonstrate that CPS models
satisfy their requirements.
More recently, falsification-based testing techniques have been
proposed as a way to test CPS models with respect to their require-
ments [12, 80, 97, 98]. These techniques are black-box and aim to
find test inputs violating system requirements. They are guided
by (quantitative) fitness functions that can estimate how far a can-
didate test is from violating some system requirement. Candidate
tests are sampled from the search input space using randomized or
meta-heuristic search strategies (e.g., [27, 72, 74]). To compute fit-
ness functions, the model under test is executed for each candidate
test input. The fitness values then determine whether the goal of
testing is achieved (i.e., a requirement violation is found) or further
test candidates should be selected. In the latter case, the fitness
values may guide selection of new test candidates. Falsification-
based testing has shown to be effective in revealing requirements
violations in complex CPS models that cannot be handled by al-
ternative verification methods. However, serious scalability issues
arise when testing CI-CPS models since simulating such models
for every candidate test may take such a large amount time to the
extent that testing becomes impractical.
In this paper, in order to enable efficient and effective testing of
CI-CPS models, we propose a technique that combines falsification-
based testing with an approximation-refinement loop. Our tech-
nique, shown in Figure 1, is referred to as AppRoxImation-based
TEst generatiOn (ARIsTEO) and targets systems that exhibit both
continuous and discrete dynamic behaviors (e.g., Simulink [7] and
hybrid systems [56]). As shown in the figure, provided with a CI-
CPS model under test (MUT), we automatically create an approxi-
mation of the MUT that closely mimics its behavior but is signif-
icantly cheaper to execute. We refer to the approximation model
as surrogate model, and generate it using System Identification (SI)
(e.g., [29, 93]) which is a methodology for building mathematical
models of dynamic systems using measurements of the system’s
inputs and outputs [93]. Specifically, we use some pairs of inputs
and outputs from the MUT to build an initial surrogate model. We
then apply falsification testing to the surrogate model instead of
the MUT until we find a test revealing some requirement violation
for the surrogate model. The identified failure, however, might be
spurious. Hence, we check the test on the MUT. If the test is spuri-
ous, we use the output of the test to retrain, using SI, our surrogate
model into a new model that more closely mimics the behavior of
the MUT, and continue with testing the retrained surrogate model.
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Figure 1: ARIsTEO: AppRoxImation-based TEst generatiOn.
If the test is not spurious, we have found a requirement violation
by running the MUT very few times.
ARIsTEO is inspired, at a high-level, by the counter-example
guided abstraction-refinement (CEGAR) loop [36, 37, 67] proposed
to increase scalability of formal verification techniques. In CEGAR,
boolean abstract models are generated and refined based on counter-
examples produced by model checking, while in ARIsTEO, numeri-
cal approximation of CPS models are learned and retrained using
test inputs and outputs generated by model testing.
Our contributions are as follows:
•We developed ARIsTEO, an approximation-refinement testing tech-
nique, to identify requirements violations for CI-CPSmodels.ARIsTEO
combines falsification-based testing with surrogate models built
using System Identification (SI). We have implemented ARIsTEO
as a Matlab/Simulink standalone application, relying on the exist-
ing state-of-the-art System Identification toolbox of Matlab as well
as S-Taliro [19], a state-of-the-art, open source falsification-based
framework for Simulink models.
•We compared ARIsTEO and S-Taliro to assess the effectiveness and
efficiency of our proposed approximation-refinement testing loop. Our
experiments, performed on five publicly-available Simulink models
from the literature, show that, on average, ARIsTEO finds 23.9%
more requirements violations than S-Taliro and finds the violations
in 31.3% less time than the time S-Taliro needs to find them.
•We evaluated usefulness and applicability of ARIsTEO in revealing
requirements violations in large and industrial CI-CPS models from
the satellite domain. We analyzed three different requirements over
two different versions of a CI-CPS model provided by LuxSpace [4],
our industrial partner. ARIsTEO successfully detected violations in
each of these versions and for all the requirements, requiring four
hour, on average, to find each violation. In contrast, S-Taliro was
not able to find any violation on neither of the model versions and
after running for four hours.
Structure. Section 2 presents our running example, formulates
the problem and describes our assumptions. Section 3 describes
ARIsTEO, which is then evaluated in Section 4. Section 5 provides
an in-depth discussion of threats to validity. Section 6 presents the
related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 CPS MODELS AND FALSIFICATION-BASED
TESTING
In this section, we describe how test inputs are generated for
black-box testing of CPS models. We then introduce the baseline
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Table 1: Input Profile for the SAT-EX case study.
Magnetometer Gyro Reaction wheel Magnetorquer
int(n) pchip(16) pchip(16) pchip(16) pchip(16)
R [-20,50] [-15,50] [-20,50] [-20,50]
falsification-based testing framework we use in this paper to test
CPS models against their requirements.
Black-box testing of CPS models. We consider CPS models
under test (MUT) specified in Simulink since it is a prevalent lan-
guage used in CPS development [39, 68]. Our approach is not tied
to the Simulink language, and can be applied to other executable
languages requiring inputs and generating outputs that are signals
over time (e.g., hybrid systems [56]). Such languages are common
for CPS as engineers need to describe models capturing interactions
of a system with its physical environment [15]. We use SAT-EX, a
model of a $20-million satellite, as a running example, which is a
simplification of a real model developed by LuxSpace [4], a satellite
system provider and partner in our research project.
Let time domainT = [0,b] be a non-singular bounded interval of
R. A signal is a function f : T → R. We indicate individual signals
using lower case letters, and sets of signals using upper case letters.
LetM be an MUT. We write Y =M(U ) to indicate that the model
M takes a set of signalsU = {u1,u2 . . .um } as input and produces
a set of signals Y = {y1,y2 . . .yn } as output. Each ui corresponds
to one model input signal, and each yi corresponds to one model
output signal. We use the notation ui (t) and yi (t) to, respectively,
indicate the values of the input signal ui and the output signal yi
at time t . For example, the SAT-EX model has four input signals
indicating the temperatures perceived by the Magnetometer, Gyro,
Reaction wheel and Magnetorquer components, and one output
signal representing the orientation (a.k.a attitude) of the satellite.
To execute a Simulink MUTM, the simulation engine receives
signal inputs defined over a time domain and computes signal
outputs at successive time steps over the same time domain used for
the inputs. A test input forM is, therefore, a set of signal functions
assigned to the input signals {u1,u2 . . .um } of M. To generate
signal functions, we have to generate values over the time interval
T = [0,b]. This, however, cannot be done in a purely random
fashion, since input signals are expected to conform to some specific
shape to ensure dynamic properties pertaining to their semantic.
For example, input signals may be constant, piecewise constant,
linear, piecewise linear, sinusoidal, etc. To address this issue, we
parameterize each input signal ui by an interpolation function, a
value range R and a number n of control points (with n > 2). To
generate a signal function for ui , we then randomly select n control
points ui (t1) to ui (tn ) within R such that t1 = 0, tn = b and t2 to
tn−1 are from T such that t1 < t2 < . . . < tn−1 < tn . The values of
t2 < t3 < . . . < tn−1 can be either randomly chosen or they can
be fixed with equal differences between each subsequent pairs, i.e,
(ti+1 − ti ) = (ti − ti−1). The interpolation function is then used to
connect the n control points ui (t1) to ui (tn ). ARIsTEO currently
supports several interpolation functions, such as piecewise constant,
linear and piecewise cubic interpolation. For each inputui ofM, we
define a triple ⟨inti ,Ri ,ni ⟩, where inti is an interpolation function,
Ri is the range of signal values and ni is the number of control
Algorithm 1 Baseline Falsification-based Testing.
1: function Falsification-Test(M, IP, MAX)
2: repeat
3: if U is null then
4: U = Generate(M, IP); ▷ Generate a candidate test input
5: else
6: U = Search(M, IP,U ); ▷ Generate next candidate test
input
7: end if
8: Y =M(U ); ▷ ExecuteM forU
9: if TObj(U ,Y ) ≤ 0 then ▷ Check ifU reveals a violation
10: returnU ;
11: end if
12: until the number of executions ofM reaches MAX
13: return ⊥ and the test input U , among those generated, with
the lowest fitness value;
14: end function
points. We refer to the set of all such triples for all inputs u1 to um
ofM as an input profile ofM and denote it by IP. Provided with
an input profile for an MUT M, we can randomly generate test
inputs forM as sets of signal functions for every input u1 to um .
For example, the input profile for SAT-EX provided by LuxSpace is
reported in Table 1, where [−20, 50], [−15, 50], [−20, 50], [−20, 50]
are real value domains.
Baseline falsification-based testing. The goal is to produce a
test inputU that, when executed on the MUTM, reveals a violation
of some requirement of M. Algorithm 1 represents a high-level
overview of falsification-based testing. It is a black-box testing pro-
cess and includes threemain components: (1) a test input generation
component (Generate in Algorithm 1), (2) a test objective deter-
mining whether, or not, a requirement violation is identified (TObj
in Algorithm 1), and (3) a search strategy to traverse the search
input space and select candidate tests (Search in Algorithm 1).
We describe Generate, Search and TObj. The input to the
algorithm is an MUT M together with its input profile IP and
the maximum number MAX of executions of MUT that can be per-
formed within an allotted test budget time. Note that we choose the
maximum number of executions as a loop terminating condition,
but an equivalent terminating condition can be defined in term of
maximum execution time.
Initial test Generation (Generate). It produces a (candidate) test
input U for M by randomly selecting control points within the
ranges and applying the interpolation functions as specified in IP.
Iterative search (Search). It selects a new (candidate) test input
U from the search input space of M. It uses the input profile IP
to generate new test inputs. The existing candidate test input U
may or may not be used in the selection of the new test input. In
particular, Search(M, IP,U ) can be implemented using different
randomized or meta-heuristic search algorithms [73, 78, 80]. These
algorithms can be purely explorative and generate the new test
input randomly without considering the existing test inputU (e.g.,
Monte-Carlo search [80]), or they may be purely exploitative and
generate the new test input by slightly modifying U (e.g., Hill
Climbing [73, 78]). Alternatively, the search algorithmmay combine
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both explorative and exploitative heuristics (e.g., Hill Climbing with
random restarts [70]).
Test objective (TObj). It maps every test input U and its corre-
sponding output Y , i.e., Y = M(U ), into a test objective value
TObj(U ,Y ) in the set R of real numbers. Note that computing test
objective values requires simulatingM for each candidate test in-
put. We assume for each requirement ofM, we have a test objective
TObj that satisfies the following conditions:
TObj1 If TObj(U ,M(U )) < 0, the requirement is violated;
TObj2 If TObj(U ,M(U )) ≥ 0, the requirement is satisfied;
TObj3 The more positive the test objective value, the farther the
system from violating its requirement; the more negative,
the farther the system from satisfying its requirement.
These conditions ensure that we can infer using the value of TObj
whether a test cases passes or fails, and further, TObj serves as a
distance function, estimating how far a test is from violating model
requirements, and hence, it can be used to guide generation of test
cases. The robustness semantics of STL is an example of a semantics
that satisfies those conditions [49]. An example requirement for
SAT-EX is:
SatReq “the difference among the satellite attitude and the target
attitude should not exceed 2 degrees".
This requirement can be expressed in many languages including
formal logics that predicate on signals, such as Signal Temporal Log-
ics (STL) [71] and Restricted Signals First-Order Logic (RFOL) [76].
For example, this requirement can be expressed in STL as
G[0,24h] (error < 2)
where error is the difference among the satellite attitude and the
target attitude, G is the “globally" STL temporal operator which is
parametrized with the interval [0, 24h], i.e., the property error < 2
should hold for the entire simulation time (24h).
We define a test objective TObj for this requirement as
TObj(U ,M(U )) = min
t ∈[0,24h]
(error (t) − 2)
This is consistent with the robustness semantics of STL [49]. This
value ensures the conditions TObj1, TObj2 and TObj3 since if the
property is violated, i.e., there exists a time instant t such that
error (t) − 2 < 0, a negative value is returned. In the opposite case,
the property is satisfied and TObj(U ,M(U )) returns a non negative
value. Furthermore, the more positive the test objective value, the
farther the system from violating its requirement; and the more
negative, the farther the system from satisfying its requirement.
In our work, we use the S-Taliro tool [19] which implements the
falsification-based testing shown in Algorithm 2. S-Taliro is a well-
developed, open source research tool for falsification based-testing
and has been recently classified as ready for industrial deploy-
ment [64]. It has been applied to several realistic and industrial
systems [95] and based on a recent survey on the topic [64] is the
most mature tool for falsification of CPSs. Further, S-Taliro supports
a range of standard search algorithms such as Simulated Annealing,
Monte Carlo [80], and gradient descent methods [12].
Algorithm 2 The ARIsTEO Main Loop.
1: function ARIsTEO(M, IP, MAX_REF)
2: repeat
3: if Mˆ is null then
4: Mˆ=Approximate(M); ▷ Generate a surrogate model
5: else
6: Mˆ=Refine(Mˆ,U ,M); ▷ Refine the surrogate model
7: end if
8: U=Falsification-Test(Mˆ, IP, MAX);
9: if TObj(U ,M(U )) ≤ 0 then ▷ TestU finds a real violation
10: returnU ;
11: end if
12: until the number of executions ofM reaches MAX_REF
13: return ⊥;
14: end function
Test objectives can be defined manually. Alternatively, assuming
that the requirements are specified in logic languages, test objec-
tives satisfying the three conditions we described earlier can be gen-
erated automatically. In particular, we have identified two existing
tools that generate quantitative test objectives from requirements
encoded in logic-based languages: Taliro [48] and Socrates [76]. In
this paper, we use Taliro since it is integrated into S-Taliro. To do so,
we specified our requirements into Signal Temporal logic (STL) [71]
and used Taliro to automatically convert them into quantitative
test objectives capturing degrees of satisfaction and refutation con-
forming to our conditions TObj1-TObj3 on test objectives.
3 ARISTEO
Algorithm 2 shows the approximation-refinement loop of ARIsTEO.
The algorithm relies on the following inputs: a CI-CPS modelM
(i.e., the model under test—MUT), the input profile IP of MUT, and
the maximum number of iterations MAX_REF that can be executed
by ARIsTEO. In the first iteration, an initial surrogate model Mˆ
is computed such that it approximates the MUT behavior (Line 4).
Note that Mˆ is built such that it has the same input profile asM,
i.e., Mˆ andM have exactly the same inputs and outputs. At every
iteration, the algorithm applies falsification-based testing to the
surrogate model Mˆ in order to find a test input U violating the
requirement captured by the test objective TObj (Line 8). Note that,
if the falsification-based testing framework is not able to find a test
input U violating the requirement, it returns the one, among those
generated, with the lowest fitness value. The number MAX of itera-
tions of falsification-based testing for Mˆ is an internal parameter of
ARIsTEO, and in general, can be set to a high value since executing
Mˆ is not expensive. OnceU is found, the algorithm checks whether
U leads to a violation when it is checked on the MUT (Line 9). Recall
from Section 2 that test objectives TObj are defined such that a
negative value indicates a requirement violation. If so,U is returned
as a failure-revealing test forM (Line 10). Otherwise,U is spurious
and in the next iteration it is used to refine the surrogate model Mˆ
(Line 6). If no failure-revealing test forM is found after MAX_REF
iterations the algorithm stops and a null value (⊥) is returned.
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The falsification-based testing procedure is described in Section 2
(Algorithm 1). In Section 3.1, we describe the Approximatemethod
(line 4), and in Section 3.2, we describe the Refine method (line 6).
3.1 Approximation
Given an MUT M, the goal of the approximation is to produce
a surrogate model Mˆ such that: (C1) M and Mˆ have the same
interface, i.e., the same inputs and outputs; (C2) provided with the
same input values, they generate similar output values; and (C3) Mˆ
is less expensive to execute thanM.
We rely on System Identification (SI) techniques to produce
surrogate models [93] since their purpose is to automatically build
mathematical models of dynamical systems from data when it is
difficult to build the models analytically, or when engineers want
to build models from data obtained based on measurements of the
actual hardware. Note that the more complex SI structures (i.e., non-
linear nlarx and hw) rely on machine learning and neural network
algorithms [69].
To build Mˆ using SI, we need some input and output data from
the MUTM. SinceM is expensive to execute, to build the initial
surrogate model Mˆ (line 6), we runM for one inputU only. Note
that an inputU ofM is a set {u1, . . . ,um } of signal functions over
T = [0,b]. So, each ui is a sequence ui (0),ui (δ ),ui (2 · δ ) . . .ui (l · δ )
where b = l ·δ and δ is the sampling rate applied to the time domain
[0,b]. Similarly, the outputY =M(U ) is a set {y1, . . . ,yn } of signal
functions where eachyj is a sequenceyj (0),yj (δ ),yj (2·δ ) . . .yj (l ·δ )
obtained based on the same sampling rate and the same time domain
as those used for the input. We refer to the data used to build Mˆ
as traning data and denote it by D. Specifically, D = ⟨U ,Y ⟩. For
CI-CPS, the size l of D tends to be large since we typically execute
such models for a long time duration (large b) and use a small
sampling rate (small δ ) for them. For example, we typically run
SAT-EX for b = 86 400s (24h) and use the sampling rate δ = 0.0312s.
Hence, a single execution of SAT-EX generates a training data set
D with size l = 2 769 200. Such training data size is sufficient for SI
to build reasonably accurate surrogate models.
We use the System Identification Toolbox [69] of Matlab to gen-
erate surrogate models. In order to effectively use SI, we need
to anticipate the expected structure and parameters of surrogate
models, a.k.a configuration. Table 2 shows some standard model
structures and parameters supported by SI. Specifically, selecting
the model structure is about deciding which mathematical equation
among those shown in Table 2 is more likely to fit to our training
data and is better able to capture the dynamics of the modelM. As
shown in Table 2, equations specifying the model structure have
some parameters that need to be specified so that we can apply
SI techniques. For example, for arx(na,nb,nk), the values of the
parameters na, nb and nk are the model parameters.
Table 2 provides a short description for each model structure. We
note that some of the equations in the table are simplified and refer
to the case in which the MUT has a single input signal and a single
output signal. The equations, however, can be generalized to models
with multiple input and output signals. Briefly, model structures
can be linear or non-linear in terms of the relation between the
inputs and outputs, or they can be continuous and discrete in terms
of their underlying training data. Specifically, the training data
generated from MUT can be either discrete (i.e., sampled at a fixed
rate) or continuous (i.e., sampled at a variable rate). Provided with
discrete training data, we can select either continuous or discrete
model structures, while for continuous training data, we can select
continuous model structures only. As discussed earlier, our training
data D is discrete since it is sampled at the fix sampling rate of δ .
Hence, we can choose both types of model structures to generate
surrogate models. In our work we support training data sampled at
a fixed sampling rate to build and refine the surrogate models. Data
sampled at a variable time rate can be then handled by exploiting
the resampling procedure of Matlab [9].
The users of ARIsTEO need to choose upfront the configuration
to be used by the SI, i.e., the model structure and the values of its
parameters. This choice depends on domain specific knowledge
that the engineers possess for the model under analysis. The values
of the parameters selected by the user should be chosen such that
the resulting surrogate model (i) has the same interface as the
MUT to ensure C1 and (ii) has a simpler structure than the MUT
to ensure C3. The System Identification Toolbox provides some
generic guidance for selecting the parameters ensuring these two
criteria [6]. In this work we performed an empirical evaluation over
a set of benchmark models to determine the configuration to be
used in our experiments (Section 4.1).
Once a configuration is selected, SI uses the training data to learn
values for the coefficients of the equation from Table 2 that corre-
sponds to the selected structure and paramters. For example, after
selecting arx(na,nb,nk) and assigning values to na, nb and nk , SI
generates a surrogate model by learning values for the coefficients:
a1, . . . ana and b1, . . .bnb .
Similar to standard machine learning algorithms, SI’s objective
is to compute the model coefficients by minimizing the difference
(error) between the outputs ofM and Mˆ for the training data [93].
SI uses different standard notions of errors depending on the model
structure selected. In our work, we compute the Mean Squared
Error (MSE) [93] between the outputs ofM and Mˆ.
SI learns a surrogate model Mˆ by minimizing MSE over the
training dataD and hence, ensuring C2. The learning algorithm se-
lected by SI depends on the chosen model structure, on the purpose
of the identification process, i.e., whether the identified model will
be used for prediction or simulation, and on whether the system is
continuous or discrete.
3.2 Refinement
The refinement step rebuilds the surrogate model Mˆ when the
test inputU obtained by falsification-based testing of the surrogate
model is spurious for MUT (i.e., it does not reveal any failure ac-
cording to the test objective). Note that Mˆ may not be sufficiently
accurate to predict the behavior of the MUT. Hence, it is likely that
we need to improve its accuracy and we do so by reusing the data
obtained when checking a candidate test input U on MUT (line 9
of Algorithm 2).
Let U = {u1, . . . ,um } and Y = {y1, . . . ,yn } be the spurious test
inputs and its output, respectively. Similar to the data used to build
the initial Mˆ by the approximate step (line 9 of Algorithm 2), the
data D ′ = ⟨U ,Y ⟩ used to rebuild Mˆ is also discretized based on
the same sampling rate δ . To refine the surrogate model, we do not
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Table 2: Model structure and parameter choices for developing surrogate models.
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Model Structure Equation Model Type
arx(na,nb,nk) y(t) = a1 · y(t − 1) + . . . + ana · y(t − na) + b1 · u(t − nk) + . . . + bnb · u(t − nb − nk + 1) + e(t) Discrete
Description
The output y depends on previous input values, i.e., u(t − nk),. . . ,u(t − nb − nk + 1), and on values assumed by the output y in previous steps, i.e., y(t − 1),. . . ,y(t − na).
na and nb are the number of past output and input values to be used in predicting the next output. nk is the delay (number of samples) from the input to the output.
Model Structure Equation Model Type
armax(na,nb,nk,nc) y(t) = a1 ·y(t − 1)+ . . .+ana ·y(t −na)+b1 ·u(t −nk)+ . . .+bnb ·u(t −nb −nk + 1)+c1 ·e(t − 1)+ . . .+cnc ·e(t −nc)+e(t) Discrete
Description
Extends the arx model by considering how the values e(t − 1),. . . , e(t − nc) of the noise e at time t , t − 1, . . ., t − nc influence the value y(t) of the output y.
Model Structure Equation Model Type
bj(nb,nc,nf ,nd,nk) y(t) = B(z)F (z) · u(t) +
C(z)
D(z) · e(t) Discrete
Description
Box-Jenkins models allow a more general noise description than armax models. The output y depends on a finite number of previous input u and output y values. The
values nb , nc , nd , nf , nk indicate the parameters of the matrix B, C , D, F and the value of the input delay.
Model Structure Equation Model Type
tf(np,nz) y(t) = b0+b1 ·s+b2 ·s2+...+bn ·snz1+f1 ·s+f2 ·s2+...+fm ·snp · u(t) + e(t) Continuous
Description
Represents a transfer function model. The values np , nz indicate the number of poles and zeros of the transfer function.
Model Structure Equation Model Type
ss(n) x(0) = x0
Ûx(t) = Fx(t) +Gu(t) + Kw(t)
y(t) = Hx(t) + Du(t) +w(t)
Continuous
Description
Uses state variables to describe a system by a set of first-order differential or difference equations. n is an integer indicating the size of the matrix F , G, K , H and D.
N
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Model Structure Equation Model Type
nlarx(f ,na,nb,nk) y(t) = f (y(t − 1), ...,y(t − na),u(t − nk), ...,u(t − nk − nb + 1)) Discrete
Description
Uses a non linear function f to describe the input/output relation. Wavelet, sigmoid networks or neural networks in the Deep Learning Matlab Toolbox [3] can be used
to compute the function f . na and nb are the number of past output and input values used to predict the next output value. nk is the delay from the input to the output.
Model Structure Equation Model Type
hw(f ,h,na,nb,nk) w(t) = f (u(t))
x(t) = (B(z)/F (z)) ·w(t)
y(t) = h(x(t))
Continuous
Description
Hammerstein-Wiener models describe dynamic systems two nonlinear blocks in series with a linear block. Specifically, f and h are non linear functions, B(z), F (z), na,
nb, nk are defined as for bj models. Different nonlinearity estimators can be used to learn f and h similarly to the nlarx case.
change the considered configuration, but we combine the new D ′
and existing training data D, and refine Mˆ using these data.
Alternative policies can be chosen to refine the surrogate model.
For example, the refinement activity may also change the configu-
ration of ARIsTEO. This is a rather drastic change in the surrogate
model. When engineers have a clear understanding of the underly-
ing model, they may be able to define a systematic methodology
on how to move from less complex structures (e.g., linear) to more
complex ones (e.g., non-linear). Without proper domain knowledge,
such modification may be too disruptive. In this paper, our refine-
ment strategy is focused on incrementing the training data and
rebuilding the surrogate model without changing the configuration.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate ARIsTEO by answering the
following research questions:
• Configuration - RQ1.Which are the optimal (most effective and
efficient) SI configurations for ARIsTEO? Which of the optimal config-
urations can be used in the rest of our experiments? We investigate
the performance of ARIsTEO for different SI configurations (model
structures and parameters listed in Table 2) to identify the optimal
ones, i.e., those that offer the best trade-offs between effectiveness
(revealing the most requirements violations) and efficiency (reveal-
ing the violations in less time). We then select one configuration
among the optimal ones and use that configuration for the rest of
our experiments.
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• Effectiveness - RQ2.How effective is ARIsTEO in generating tests
that reveal requirements violations? We use ARIsTEO with the opti-
mal configuration identified in RQ1 and evaluate its effectiveness
(i.e., its ability in detecting requirements violations) by comparing
it with falsification-based testing without surrogate models. We use
S-Taliro discussed in Section 2 for the baseline of comparison.
• Efficiency - RQ3. How efficient is ARIsTEO in generating tests
revealing requirements violations? Weuse ARIsTEOwith the optimal
configuration identified in RQ1 and evaluate its efficiency (i.e., the
time it takes to find violations) by comparing it with falsification-
based testing without surrogate models (i.e., S-Taliro).
A key challenge regarding the empirical evaluation of ARIsTEO
is that, both ARIsTEO and S-Taliro rely on randomized algorithms.
Hence, we have to repeat our experiments numerous times for
different models and requirements so that the results can be anal-
ysed in a sound and systematic way using statistical tests [20].
This is necessary to answer RQ1-RQ3 that involve selecting an
optimal configuration and comparing ARIsTEO with the baseline S-
Taliro. Performing these experiments on CI-CPS models is, however,
extremely expensive, to the point that the experiments become in-
feasible. A ballpark figure for the execution time of the experiments
required to answer RQ1-RQ3 is around 50 years if the experiments
are performed on our CI-CPS model case study (SAT-EX). There-
fore, instead of using CI-CPS models, we use non-CI-CPS models to
address RQ1-RQ3. The implications of this decision on the results
are assessed and mitigated in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 where we discuss
these three research questions in detail. In addition, to be able to
still assess the performance of ARIsTEO on CI-CPS models, we
consider an additional research question described below:
• Usefulness - RQ4. How applicable and useful is ARIsTEO in gen-
erating tests revealing requirements violations for industrial CI-CPS
models? We apply ARIsTEO with the optimal configuration iden-
tified in RQ1 to our CI-CPS model case study from the satellite
industry (SAT-EX) and evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. The
focus here is to obtain representative results in terms of effective-
ness and efficiency based on an industry CI-CPS model. Note that
we still apply S-Taliro to SAT-EX to be able to compare it with
ARIsTEO for an industry CI-CPS model. This comparison, however,
is not meant to be subject to statistical analysis due to the large
execution time of SAT-EX, and is only meant to complement RQ3
with a fully realistic though extremely time consuming study.
The subject models. We used five publicly available non-CI-
CPS models (i.e., RHB(1), RHB(2), AT, AFC, IGC) that have been
previously used in the literature on falsification-based testing of
CPS models [40, 47, 51, 61, 90, 101]. The models represent realistic
and representative models of CPS systems from different domains.
RHB(1) and RHB(2) [51] are from the IoT and smart home domain.
AFC [61] is from the automotive domain and has been originally
developed by Toyota. AT [101] is another model from the auto-
motive domain. IGC [90] is from the health care domain. AT and
AFC have also been recently considered as a part of the reference
benchmarks in the ARCH competition [47] – an international com-
petition among verification and testing tools for continuous and
hybrid systems [2]. The models include both discrete (e.g., logic
decisions and state machines) and continuous (e.g., dynamical sys-
tems) behaviors. For example, RHB and AT contain state machines
represented as Stateflows diagrams [11]. Stateflow specifications
can represent logical decisions, such as the one produced by a plan-
ner (i.e., sequences of states and transitions labeled with movement
commands). These models have been manually developed and may
violate their requirements due to human errors. Some of the vio-
lations have been identified by the existing testing tools and are
reported in the literature [47, 51, 61, 90, 101]. Regarding the CI-CPS
model to address RQ4, we use the SAT-EX case study that we intro-
duced as a running example in Sections 2 and 3. SAT-EX contains
2192 blocks and has to be simulated for 24h, for each test case, to
sufficiently exercise the system dynamics and interactions with the
environment. The SAT-EX case study is a complex industrial system
that includes physical dynamics and control algorithms, but also
complex logic and decisions. For example, the satellite includes a
function that controls the hysteresis logic that regulates the switch-
ing between the course and the fine pointing laws of the satellite,
a Kalman filter [63] to estimate the position of the satellite, logic
that controls the normal and safe modes of the satellite, complex
functions that go beyond reading and retrieving sensors readings,
and pre-compiled S-Functions provided by third parties vendors.
Like the non-CI-CPS models, SAT-EX is manually developed by
engineers and is likely to be faulty. Its inputs and input profiles are
shown in Table 1.
Implementation andDataAvailability.We implementedARIs-
TEO as a Matlab application and as an add-on of S-Taliro. Our (san-
itized) models, data and tool are available online [1] and are also
submitted alongside the paper.
4.1 RQ1 - Configuration
Recall that ARIsTEO requires to be provided with a configuration to
build surrogate models. The universe of the possible configurations
is infinite as the model structures in Table 2 can be parametrized in
an infinite number of ways by associating different values to their
parameters. RQ1 identifies the optimal configurations that yield
the best tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency for ARIsTEO
among a reasonably large set of alternative representative configu-
rations. It then selects one among the optimal configurations.
We do not evaluate configurations by measuring their prediction
accuracy (i.e., by measuring their prediction error when applied to a
set of test data as is common practice in assessing prediction models
in the machine learning area [28]) because our focus is not to have
the most accurate configuration but the one that is able to have
the most effective impact on ARIsTEO’s approximation-refinement
loop by quickly finding requirements violations. However, it is
likely that there exists a relationship between the two.
Experiment design.We consider five different configurations
obtained by five different sets of parameter values for each model
structure in Table 2. We denote the five configurations related to
each model structure S by S1 to S5. For example, the configurations
related to the model structure ss are denoted by ss1 to ss5. The
specific parameter value sets for the 35 configurations based on the
seven model structures in Table 2 are available online [1].
To answer RQ1, we apply ARIsTEO to the five non-CI-CPS mod-
els using each configuration among the 35 possible ones. That is,
we execute ARIsTEO 175 times. We further rerun each applica-
tion of ARIsTEO 100 times to account for the randomness in both
falsification-based testing and the approximation-refinement loop
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Figure 2: Effectiveness and efficiency of different configura-
tions across our non-CI-CPS subject models.
of ARIsTEO [27]. We set the value of MAX_REF, i.e, the number of
iterations of the ARIsTEO’s main loop, to 10 (see Algorithm 2) and
the value of MAX, i.e, the number times each iteration of ARIsTEO
executes falsification-based testing (see Algorithm 1), to 100 for
RHB(1), RHB(2) and AFC, and to 1000 for AT and IGC. These values
were used in the original experiments that apply falsification-based
testing to these models [10]. Running all the 17,500 experiments
required 4 315 567 hours (≈ 99 days).2
Due the sheer size of the experiments required to answer RQ1,
we used our non-CI-CPS subject models. While these models are
smaller than typical CI-CPS models, the complexity of their struc-
ture (how Simulink blocks are used and connected) is similar to the
one of SAT-EX. Specifically, the structural complexity index [81, 83],
which provides an estimation of the complexity of the structure of
a Simulink model, is 1.8, 1.6, 1.2, 1.1, 2.1 for the RHB(1), RHB(2),
AT, AFC and IGC benchmarks, respectively, and 1.5 for the SAT-EX
case study. We conjecture that given these similarities, the efficiency
and effectiveness comparisons of the configurations performed
on non-CI-CPS models would likely remain the same should the
comparisons be performed on CI-CPS models. However, due to com-
putational time restrictions, we are not able to check this conjecture.
Finally, we note that even if we select a sub-optimal configuration, it
will be a disadvantage for ARIsTEO. So, the results for RQ2-RQ4 are
likely to improve if we find a way to identify a better configuration
for ARIsTEO using CI-CPS models.
Results. The scatter plot in Figure 2 shows the results of our
experiments. The x-axis indicates our efficiency metric which is
defined as the number of iterations that ARIsTEO requires to reveal
a requirement violation in a model for a given configuration. As
2 We used the high performance HPC facilities of the University of Luxembourg [96]
with 100 Dell PowerEdge C6320 and a total of 2800 cores with 12.8 TB RAM. The
parallelization reduced the experiments time to approximately 15 days.
described in the experiment design, the maximum number of itera-
tions is 10. Given a configuration for ARIsTEO, the fewer iterations
required to reveal a violation, the more efficient that configuration
is. The y-axis indicates our effectiveness metric which is defined as
the number of ARIsTEO runs (out of 100) that can reveal a violation
in a model. For effectiveness we are interested in knowing how
often we are able to reveal a requirement violation. The higher the
number of runs detecting violations, the more effective that configu-
ration is. The ideal configuration is the one that finds requirements
violations in 100% of the runs in just one iteration as indicated by
the origin of the plot in Figure 2 with coordinates (1, 100).
For each configuration, there is one point in the plot in Figure 2
whose coordinates, respectively, indicate the average efficiency and
effectiveness of that configuration for the non-CI-CPS subject mod-
els. As shown in the figure, bj1 and ss2 are on the Pareto frontier [8]
and dominate other configurations in terms of efficiency and ef-
fectiveness. That is, any configuration other than bj1 and ss2 is
strictly dominated in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by
either bj1 or ss2. But bj1 does not dominate ss2, and neither does ss2.
Specifically, bj1 is more efficient but less effective than ss2, and ss2
is less efficient but more effective than bj1. For our experiments, we
select bj1 as the optimal configuration since efficiency is paramount
when dealing with CI-CPS models. In terms of effectiveness, bj1 is
only slightly less effective than ss2 (46.4% versus 52.4%).
The answer to RQ1 is that, among all the 35 configurations we
compared, the bj1 and the ss2 configurations are the optimal con-
figurations offering the best trade-off between efficiency (i.e., time
required to reveal requirements violations) and effectiveness (i.e.,
number of violations revealed) for ARIsTEO. We select bj1 as we
prioritize efficiency.
4.2 RQ2 and RQ3 - Effectiveness and Efficiency
For RQ2 and RQ3, we compare ARIsTEO (Algorithm 2) with S-Taliro
(Algorithm 1). As discussed earlier, due to the large size of the ex-
periments, we use non-CI-CPS models, but we want to obtain results
that are representative for the CI-CPS case. For such comparisons,
we need to execute both tools for an equivalent amount of time
and then compare their effectiveness and efficiency. This is a non
trivial problem, because
• That equivalent amount of time cannot simply translate into
identical execution times. Non-CI-CPS models, by definition,
are very quick to execute. Hence, the benefits of performing
the falsification on the surrogate model, as done by ARIsTEO,
would not be visible if we compared the two tools based
on the execution times of non-CI-CPS models. Therefore,
comparisons would be in favour of S-Taliro if we fix the
execution times of the two tools for non-CI-CPS models.
• Neither can we can run the two tools for the same number
of iterations, as commonly done in this domain [47], because
one iteration of ARIsTEO takes more time than one iteration
of S-Taliro. Recall that ARIsTEO, in addition to performing
falsification, builds and refines surrogate models in each
iteration. Thus, by fixing the number of iterations for the
two tools, comparisons would be in favour of ARIsTEO.
To answer RQ2 and RQ3 without favouring neither of the tools,
we propose the following:
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Table 3: The effectiveness results. Percentages of cases in
which ARIsTEO (IAi labelled columns) and S-Taliro (IBi la-
belled columns) were able to detect requirements violations
for different iteration pairs (IAi and IBi ) and benchmarks.
IA1 IB1 IA2 IB2 IA3 IB3 IA4 IB4 IA5 IB5 IA6 IB6
RHB(1) 0% 5% 2% 2% 8% 8% 7% 7% 11% 6% 9% 8%
RHB(2) 5% 2% 6% 8% 4% 9% 5% 10% 13% 10% 7% 10%
AT 85% 7% 92% 7% 93% 7% 99% 4% 100% 8% 100% 13%
AFC 100% 77% 100% 73% 100% 88% 100% 86% 100% 92% 100% 95%
IGC 33% 4% 31% 6% 34% 9% 37% 15% 40% 18% 13% 21%
Suppose that we could perform RQ2 and RQ3 on a CI-CPS
model, and that we execute ARIsTEO and S-Taliro on this model for
the same time limit TL. Let IA and IB be the number of iterations
of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro within TL, respectively. Recall that one
iteration of ARIsTEO typically takes more time than one iteration of
the baseline (IA < IB). If we know the values of IA and IB, we can
execute ARIsTEO IA times and S-Taliro IB times on non-CI-CPS
models and use the results to compare the tools as if they were
executing on CI-CPS models.
To run our experiment, we need to know the relation between IA
and IB. We approximate this relation empirically using our SAT-EX
CI-CPS model. We execute ARIsTEO for 10 iterations and we set the
number of falsification iterations in each iteration of ARIsTEO to
100 as suggested by the literature onCPS falsification testing [10, 19]
(i.e., MAX_REF = 10 and MAX = 100 in Algorithm 2). We repeated these
runs of ARIsTEO five times. The first iteration of ARIsTEO took,
on average, 16 902s, and the subsequent iterations of ARIsTEO
took, on average, 9 865s. Note that the first iteration of ARIsTEO
is always more expensive than the subsequent iterations since
ARIsTEO builds surrogate models in the first iteration. Similarly,
we executed S-Taliro for 10 iterations on SAT-EX, and repeated this
run five times. Each iteration of S-Taliro took, on average, 8 336s on
SAT-EX. This preliminary experiment took approximately 20 days.
We then solve the two equations below to approximate the relation
between IA and IB:
TL = 9 865 × (IA − 1) + 16 902 (1)
TL = 8 336 × IB (2)
The above yields IB = 1.2 × IA + 0.8. Though we obtained this
relation between IA and IB based on one CI-CPS case study, SAT-EX
is a large and industrial system representative of the CPS domain.
Further, for CI-CPS models that are more compute-intensive than
SAT-EX, executing the models takes even more time compared to
the approximation and refinement time, and hence, the relation
above could be further improved in favour of ARIsTEO.
Experiment design. To answer RQ2 and RQ3, we applied
ARIsTEO with the configuration identified by RQ1 (bj1) and S-
Taliro to the five non-CI-CPS models in Table ??. We executed
ARIsTEO and S-Taliro for the following pairs of iterations: ⟨IA1 =
5, IB1 = 7⟩, ⟨IA2 = 7, IB2 = 9⟩, ⟨IA3 = 9, IB3 = 12⟩, ⟨IA4 =
11, IB4 = 14⟩, ⟨IA5 = 13, IB5 = 16⟩, and ⟨IA6 = 15, IB6 = 19⟩. Note
that every pair approximately satisfies IBi = 1.2 × IAi + 0.8. We
repeated each run 100 times to account for their randomness. For
RQ2, we compute the effectiveness metric as in RQ1: the number
of runs revealing requirements violations (out of 100) for each tool.
For RQ3, we assess efficiency by computing the efficiency metric as
in RQ1: the number of iterations that each tool requires to reveal a
requirement violation. However, as discussed above, the number of
iterations of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro are not comparable. Hence, for
RQ3, we report efficiency in terms of the estimated time that each
tool needs to perform those iterations on CI-CPS models computed
using equations 1 and 2.
Results-RQ2. Table 3 shows the effectiveness values for ARIs-
TEO and S-Taliro for the five iteration pairs discussed in the ex-
periment design. For the AT, AFC and IGC models, the average
effectiveness of ARIsTEO is significantly higher than that of S-
Taliro (75.4% versus 35.0% on average across benchmarks), while
for RHB(1) and RHB(2), ARIsTEO and S-Taliro reveal almost the
same number of violations (6.4% versus 7.0% on average across
benchmarks). The former difference in proportion is statistically
significant as confirmed by a two-sample z-test [75] with the level
of significance (α ) set to 0.05.
RHB(1) and RHB(2) have more outputs than the other bench-
marks and they have shorter simulation times (see Table ??). This
is an increased challenge for building accurate surrogate models.
In practice, CI-CPS models can have a large number of outputs but
they usually involve long simulation times.
The answer to RQ2 is that the selected configuration of ARIsTEO
is significantly more effective than S-Taliro for three benchmark
models while, for the other two models, they reveal almost the
same number of violations. On average, over the five models,
ARIsTEO detects 23.9%more requirements violations than S-Taliro
(min=-8%, max=95%).
Results-RQ3. The execution times (computed using equations 1
and 2) of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro for our non-CI-CPS subject models
and the iteration pairs ⟨IAi , IBi ⟩ are shown in Figure 3. The box
plots in the same row are related to the same benchmark model,
while the box plots in the same column are related to the same
iteration pair. Recall that we described the iteration pairs ⟨IAi , IBi ⟩
considered for our experiments earlier in the experiment design
subsection. As expected, the average execution times of the two
tools increases with their number of iterations.
To statistically compare the results, we used the Wilcoxon rank
sum test [75] with the level of significance (α ) set to 0.05. The results
show that ARIsTEO is significantly more efficient than S-Taliro
for the AT and IGC models (Figure 3 – rows 3,5). The efficiency
improvement that ARIsTEO brings about over S-Taliro for AT and
IGC across different iterations ranges from 14.4% (2.2h) to 73.1%
(31.2h). Note that, for AT and IGC, ARIsTEO is significantly more
effective than S-Taliro (see Table 3). This shows that, many runs of
ARIsTEO for AT and IGC can reveal a requirement violation and
stop before reaching the maximum ten iterations, hence yielding
better efficiency results of ARIsTEO compared to the other model.
For the RHB(1) and RHB(2) models (Figure 3 – rows 1,2), ARIs-
TEO and S-Taliro yield comparable efficiency results. The effective-
ness results in Table 3 confirm that, for RHB(1) and RHB(2), both
ARIsTEO and S-Taliro have to execute for ten iterations most of the
times as they cannot reveal violations (low effectiveness). Hence,
the efficiency results are worse for RHB(1) and RHB(2) than for
the other models. Further, as we run the tools for more iterations,
the efficiency results slightly increases as indicated by the increase
in the number of outliers. For the AFC model (Figure 3 – row 4),
ARIsTEO is slightly more efficient than S-Taliro. For AFC, S-Taliro
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Figure 3: Comparing the efficiency of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro. The box plots show the execution time (computed using equa-
tions 1 and 2) of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro (in hours) for our non-CI-CPS subject models (labels on the left of the figure) and over
different iterations (labels on the top of the figure). Diamonds depict the average.
is relatively effective in finding violations, and hence, is efficient.
But, its average execution time is slightly worse than that of ARIs-
TEO. Comparing the interquartile ranges of the box plots shows
that ARIsTEO is generally more efficient that S-Taliro. However, a
Wilcoxon test does not reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.06).
The average execution time of ARIsTEO and S-Taliro across
the different models is, respectively, approximately 19h and 25h.
Though there is significant variation across the different models,
ARIsTEO is, on average, 31.3% more efficient than S-Taliro.
The answer to RQ3 is that, for the considered models, the se-
lected configuration of ARIsTEO is on average 31.3% (min=−1.6%,
max=85.2%) more efficient than S-Taliro.
4.3 RQ4 - Practical Usefulness
We assess the usefulness of ARIsTEO in revealing requirements
violations of a representative industrial CI-CPS model.
Experiment design.We received three different requirements
from our industry partner [4]. One is the SatReq requirement pre-
sented in Section 2, and the two others (SatReq1 and SatReq2) are
strengthened versions of SatReq that, if violated, indicate increas-
ingly critical violations. We also received the input profile IP (Sec-
tion 2) and a more restricted input profile IP′, representing realistic
input subranges associated with more critical violations. For each
combination of the requirement (SatReq, SatReq1 and SatReq2) and
the input profiles IP and IP′, we checked whether ARIsTEO was
able to detect any requirement violation, and further, we recorded
the time needed by ARIsTEO to detect a violation. In addition, for
the two most critical requirements (SatReq1 and SatReq2) and the
input profiles IP and IP′, we checked whether S-Taliro is able to
detect any violation within the time limit required by ARIsTEO to
successfully reveal violations for SatReq1 and SatReq2. Running
this experiment took approximately four days and both tools were
run twice for each requirement and input profile combination.
Results. ARIsTEO found a violation for every requirement and
input profile combination in our study in just one iteration, re-
quiring approximately four hours of execution time. Given that
simulating the model under test takes approximately an hour and
a half, detecting errors in four hours is highly efficient as it corre-
sponds to roughly two model simulations. In comparison, S-Taliro
failed to find any violations for SatReq1 and SatReq2 after running
the tool for four hours based on the input profiles IP and IP′.
The answer to RQ4 is that ARIsTEO efficiently detected require-
ments violations – in practical time – that S-Taliro could not find,
for three different requirements and two input profiles on an
industrial CI-CPS model.
5 DISCUSSION AND THREATS TO VALIDITY
External validity. The selection of the models used in the evalua-
tion, because of the specific features they contain, is a threat to
external validity as it influences the extent to which our results
can be generalized. In the future, it is therefore important to eval-
uate ARIsTEO with a larger, more diverse set of models, which
vary in terms of complexity along different dimensions, such as
control algorithms, physical dynamics, state behavior, logic, and
decisions. We may, over time, be able to determine the character-
istics of models on which ARIsTEO fares better. However, below,
we note some facts, which tend to alleviate the threat to external
validity in our results: (1) the non-CI-CPS models (see Section 4)
we considered have been widely used in the literature on falsifica-
tion-based testing of CPS [40, 47, 51, 61, 90, 101], as they represent
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realistic and representative models of CPS systems from different
domains; (2) our CI-CPS model is a complex model of a satellite
system and environment (see Section 4), developed by our industry
partner, and is representative of industrial systems containing com-
plex algorithms, equations, logic and decisions. It also includes third
party components, with unknown features, that are provided as
pre-compiled functions; (3) ARIsTEO is obtained by combining sys-
tem identification (SI) with falsification and abstraction-refinement.
The goal of SI is not to produce a model that accurately predict the
system outputs, but a model that is sufficiently accurate to allow
ARIsTEO to detect faulty inputs. Thus, in order for ARIsTEO to
perform well, the model learned by SI does not need to be perfect
in predicting the behaviour of the MUT. Consequently, there is no
straightforward relationship between SI prediction accuracy and
the performance of ARIsTEO. In other words, even if the predictions
of the models produced by SI are not perfectly accurate, they may
still be sufficient for guiding the search of ARIsTEO toward faulty
inputs. More empirical studies, such as that presented in this paper,
are needed to precisely determine the characteristics of models on
which ARIsTEO fares better.
Internal validity.When addressing RQ2 and RQ3, the use of an
optimal configuration is a threat to internal validity, as it maxi-
mizes, on average, the effectiveness and efficiency of ARIsTEO on
the considered set of models. However, a number of considerations
alleviate this threat. First, the configuration of ARIsTEO is not in-
dividually optimized for each model but for all models at once. It
represents a general compromise among the many diverse models
based on which it was selected. This configuration, based on our
experiment, therefore represents a good default configuration when
engineers do not have additional information. Furthermore, all the
configuration parameters of ARIsTEO which are common with
S-Taliro have been assigned the same values; S-Taliro is, therefore,
in our comparisons, not at a disadvantage due to sub-optimal con-
figuration values. Last, because it is compute-intensive, the satellite
model used to address RQ4 was not part of the model set used for
selecting the configuration of ARIsTEO. RQ4 yields results that are
consistent with previous RQs. In fact, the results for RQ4 are likely
to improve if we find a way to identify a better configuration for
ARIsTEO using CI-CPS models.
6 RELATEDWORK
Formal verification techniques such as model checking aim to
exhaustively check correctness of behavioural/functional models
(e.g., [50, 57]), but they often face scalability issues for complex CPS
models. The CEGAR framework has been proposed to help model
checking scale to such models (e.g., [17, 18, 30, 34, 35, 43, 60, 79, 85,
86, 86, 87, 91, 94, 99]). As discussed in Section 1, the approximation-
refinement loop of ARIsTEO, at a general level, is inspired by CE-
GAR. Two CEGAR-based model checking approaches have been
proposed for hybrid systems capturing CPS models: (a) abstracting
hybrid system models into discrete finite state machines without
dynamics [18, 34, 35, 86, 91, 94] and (b) abstracting hybrid sys-
tems into hybrid systems with simpler dynamics [30, 43, 60, 85, 87].
These two lines of work, although supported by various automated
tools (e.g., [32, 52, 53, 58, 86]), are difficult to use in practice due to
implicit and restrictive assumptions that they make on the struc-
ture of the hybrid systems under analysis. Further, due to their
limited scalability, they are inadequate for testing CI-CPS models.
For example, Ratschan [86] proposes an approach that took more
than 10h to verify the RHB benchmark (a non-CI-CPS model also
used in this paper). In contrast, our technique tests models instead
of exhaustively verifying them. Being black-box, our approach is
agnostic to the modeling language used for MUT, and hence, is
applicable to Simulink models irrespective of their internal com-
plexities. Further, as shown in our evaluation, our approach can
effectively and efficiently test industrial CI-CPS models.
There has been earlier work to combine CEGAR with testing in-
stead of model checking (e.g., [25, 38, 42, 42, 44, 64, 66, 66, 102, 103]).
However, based on a recent survey on the topic [64], ARIsTEO is
the first approach that combines the ideas behind CEGAR with
the system identification framework to develop an effective and
efficient testing framework for CI-CPS models. Non-CEGAR based
model testing approaches for CPS have been presented in the lit-
erature [21, 26, 46, 46, 80, 82, 89, 97, 98] and are supported by
tools [13, 19, 45, 47, 64, 100]. Among these, we considered S-Taliro
as a baseline for the reasons reported in Section 3.
Zhang et al. [100] reduce the number of simulations of the MUT
by iteratively evaluating different inputs for short simulation times
and by generating at each iteration the next input based on the
final state of the simulation. This approach assumes that the inputs
are piecewise constants and does not support complex input pro-
files such as those used in our evaluation for testing our industry
CI-CPS model. To reduce the simulation time of CI-CPS models, we
can manually simplify the models while preserving the behaviour
needed to test the requirements of interest [15, 84]. However, such
manual simplifications are error-prone and reduce maintainabil-
ity [23]. Further, finding an optimal balance between accuracy and
execution time is a complex task [92].
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented ARIsTEO, a technique that combines testing with an
approximation-refinement loop to detect requirements violations
in CI-CPS models. We implemented ARIsTEO as a Matlab/Simulink
application and compared its effectiveness and efficiency with the
one of S-Taliro, a state-of-the-art testing framework for Simulink
models. ARIsTEO finds 23.9% more violations than S-Taliro and
finds those violations in 31.3% less time than S-Taliro. We evaluated
the practical usefulness of ARIsTEO on two versions of an industrial
CI-CPS model to check three different requirements. ARIsTEO
successfully triggered requirements violations in every case and
required four hours on average for each violation, while S-Taliro
failed to find any violations within four-hours.
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